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An experimental result about distributive (un)fairness in a production context 
 
(¿Importa el razonamiento imparcial en las decisiones económicas? 
 Un resultado experimental sobre (in)justicia distributiva en un contexto de producción) 
Laura Marcon 
Pedro Francés-Gómez 
Marco Faillo 
Abstract:  
The Rawlsian veil of ignorance should induce agents to behave fairly in a distributive 
context. This work tried to re-propose, through a dictator game with giving and taking 
options, a sort of original position in which reasoning behind the veil should have constituted 
a moral cue for subjects involved in the distribution of a common output with unequal means 
of production. However, our experimental context would unwittingly recall more the 
Hobbesian state of nature than the Rawlsian original position, showing that the heuristic 
resource to the Rawlsian idea of a choice behind the veil is inefficacious in distributive 
contexts. 
Keywords: justice, social contract, veil of ignorance, experiments, moral cues. 
 
Resumen: 
El velo de ignorancia rawlsiano debería inducir una conducta justa en contextos 
distributivos. Este estudio intentó, mediante un juego del Dictador con opciones de dar y 
tomar, re-crear una especie de posición original en la que el razonamiento tras el velo 
debería haber sido una señal moral para sujetos que debían distribuir una ganancia común 
conseguida con medios de producción desiguales. Sin embargo, el diseño experimental 
resultó recordar más al estado de naturaleza hobbesiano que a la posición original de 
Rawls, y demostró que el recurso heurístico a la idea de una decisión tras el velo de 
ignorancia es ineficaz en un contexto de producción y distribución. 
Palabras clave: justicia, contrato social, velo de ignorancia, experimentos, señales 
morales. 
 
Short summary: By proposing a dictator game with giving and taking options, this work 
tried to observe to what extent reasoning behind the veil of ignorance could be considered 
as a moral cue. The main finding is that the heuristic resource to the Rawlsian idea of a 
choice behind a veil of ignorance is inefficacious as a moral cue in distributive contexts. 
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I. Introduction  
 
This paper reports an unexpected experimental result and contributes to the debate about 
other-regarding vs self-interested behaviours in noncooperative games. 
The experimental approach was intended to check the impact of ‘reasoning behind a 
veil of ignorance’ on an individual’s distributive decision. By making subjects think on the 
distributive decision they would be asked to make before they knew the one relevant 
difference that the experimenter was going to introduce between the two persons that should 
split the earnings, this experiment was designed as a partial test of this feature of Rawls’s 
theory. The veil, intended as a moral cue, should have induced a reflection from an impartial 
perspective, leading subjects to put themselves in the shoes of the least advantaged person 
once the veil would have been removed. Drawing on the philosophical assumptions of 
Kantian constructivism, we supposed that the mere conception of a distributive choice 
behind the veil of ignorance should create a normative stance towards the actual distributive 
decision, even if experimental subjects were not acting within the rules of any known 
institution. And we further supposed that subjects’ behaviour, exposed to a clear moral cue 
in distributing a common output, would adjust in line with their normative conclusion. 
In fact, although the Rawlsian original position and the veil mechanism are abstractions, not 
traceable in everyday life, they are useful tools for studying individual behaviour, in situations 
of potential conflict between personal interest and the common good (Faillo et al, 2015). It 
is a question of understanding whether there is a correspondence between Rawls's 
theoretical apparatus on distributive justice and how, de facto, people behave in distributive 
contexts. The first empirical studies on Rawls’s theory (Frohlich et al, 1987; Frohlich & 
Oppenheimer, 1990, 1992; Lissowski et al, 1991) showed how the maximin principle 
defended by Rawls has no counterpart in the laboratory: subjects prefer to maximize the 
income after having established a floor constrain. Other results followed from questions on 
how subjects perceive the principles of allocation: Scott et al (2001) and Michelbach et al 
(2003) distinguished four principles of allocation - equality, efficiency, need, and merit - 
demonstrating how these principles often intervene simultaneously and in an interdependent 
manner so subjects can formulate judgments on distributive justice. 
In parallel with this literature on how different allocation principles intervene to form 
judgments on distributive justice, there exists an ever-growing experimental literature on 
non-cooperative games. These experiments mostly investigate underlying motivations in 
giving behaviour. The assumption in experimental economics is that to give away money is 
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costly for the individual and therefore it should be expected only within a framework of social, 
institutional or moral obligations coercively imposed. However, in some economic games, 
such as the Dictator, people seem to share for no reason whatsoever. 
Some factors have been detected to explain why a fair distribution got the drop on 
the rational choice theory predictions: normative and empirical expectations established by 
social norms amongst players (Hoffman et al, 1996; Bicchieri, 2006; Krupka & Weber, 2013); 
the reputation effect –subjects feel observed, hence judged, and they do not want to 
contradict their self-image (Servátka, 2009); the frame itself, conveyed by the game. In 
relation to the frame effect: if the taking option is also provided in a Dictator’s game, subjects 
may perceive choices as conflicting messages, deciding to take from the other person 
because it is one of the available alternatives (List, 2007; Levitt & List, 2007; Barsdley, 2008; 
Franzen & Pointner, 2012). Rigdon and colleagues (2009) used even a minimal social cue 
of a visual type, called watching-eyes configuration, demonstrating how its introduction had 
an impact in terms of increasing generosity. Another very important element is the 
endowment, or better, how it accrues to the subjects: if it is “manna from heaven”, namely 
offered by experimenters at the beginning of the game, or whether it is the product of 
subjects’ effort, behaviour on the final distribution changes (Faillo et al, 2019). 
Given this experimental literature, the actual game, explained in detail below, was a 
variation of the Dictator Game1 (DG) that was initially used to question the assumptions of 
economic rationality. On average, people give between 30% and 40%, which seems to show 
that ordinary people are not as selfish as economic theories assume. The introduction of 
Dictator with Taking changed this view, since in this version of the game, money is given to 
both players, and then only one of them (the dictator) has to decide whether to keep her 
portion, give part of it to the other player, or take some from the other. On average, subjects 
in this game take from their pairs, as pointed above, what seems to be a very selfish 
behaviour. 
In our case, the experimental currency was earned by both players through a real-
effort task rather than simply given to them by the experimenter, and each member’s 
contribution to the pair’s total output was common knowledge between them. The 
experiment introduces an asymmetry among players so that one member of the pair suffers 
an unjustified ‘disadvantage’ relative to the other. We expected our subjects to be aware of 
the need to redress the unjustified inequality. Our prediction was that whatever the average 
                                                             
1An experimental situation in which a subject is asked to split an amount of money, generally given by the 
experimenter, between himself and a second subject, who plays no role in the game, but simply receives what the 
‘dictator’ decides. 
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distribution was in the base treatment, introducing ‘reasoning behind the veil’ would move 
the average distribution towards a more ‘liberal egalitarian’ pattern. 
In this framework, the liberal egalitarian perspective consists in a type of distribution 
that should compensate for the initial disadvantage – in our case, a shorter time limit to 
perform the task, which is a mere random element. The assumption is that those with more 
time available could produce more and therefore claim a ‘right’ to a greater income. So, to 
repeat, the main objective is to verify the effectiveness of the veil as a moral cue: without a 
veil we expect that subjects would have chosen a distribution based on merit (everyone gets 
what she/he has produced); while introducing the veil, we expect that subjects, realizing that 
the advantageous position will not be the result of merit but of mere fortune, should seek to 
level this inequality during the distribution stage, by introducing some re-distribution from the 
advantaged party to the disadvantaged one. In fact, reasoning behind the veil should lead 
each person to think of the possibility that she is the disadvantaged party and, wishing to 
protect herself from undeserved bad luck, establish a redress mechanism. 
By isolating this element, we expected to gather empirical support for the Rawlsian 
contractual argument: if distribution changes after introducing deliberation behind the veil, 
this would imply that the original position story does track the constitution of our moral 
intuitions and norms regarding distributive justice. We had two arguments to support our 
working hypotheses: first, reasoning behind the veil of ignorance should direct our subjects 
to a generally egalitarian split of the cake; second, the fact that the thought experiment 
implied a normative reflection should make the rules of property and merit that are part of 
common morality even more salient.  
We thought that the reasoning behind the veil meant introducing a moral cue within 
the decision-making process, given the previous experiments in moral psychology and 
behavioural ethics. A strong line of research in this area has worked particularly on the 
underlying dynamics about people’s honesty and dishonesty. Some results show that trying 
to behave honestly is perceived as an effort, as a practice that is not automatic but requires 
strength of will and commitment (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Others point out that, on the one 
hand, people tend to justify their dishonest behaviour (Shalvi et al, 2015), but, in many 
situations, the self-concept of being and perceiving themselves as moral persons is a 
motivation that leads people to be more honest (Mazar et at, 2008). Ayal and colleagues 
(2015) have shown how the use of certain moral cues have an effect on human actions even 
in conditions of anonymity. One of the moral cues they used is called ‘reminding’, which, as 
confirmed by data, has been salient in influencing behaviour “utilizing principles of right and 
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wrong, specific examples of morals and ‘do's and don'ts’, and even slogan” (Ayal et al, 2015, 
p. 739). 
So, we expected the thought experiment to measurably move whatever result we 
obtained in a baseline design (with no veil of ignorance, and no moral cue) towards a more 
equal split. However, the predicted move towards egalitarianism was not observed. This left 
us puzzled. We revised our procedures, method and assumptions –see discussion sections 
below– and found no significant flaw. We conjecture a philosophical explanation for our 
result, namely, that the mere use of a moral theory as a thought experiment is not enough 
for eliciting the behaviour prescribed by the theory. This is a major amendment to Social 
Contract theory –and in general to moral theories that rely on counter-factual reasoning. But 
we need to be careful with our conclusion; since this result is so opposed to literature on 
moral cues, further research is surely required. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the experimental design 
and hypotheses in detail; results are presented in section three; section four summarizes 
and discusses our findings and explanatory conjecture. 
 
II. Experimental design and hypotheses 
 
In this study we compare two treatments, one called NOVEIL, which constitutes our 
baseline, and a second one named VEIL. In both treatments, (i) participants are grouped in 
pairs (ii) the endowment was earned (by the pair) through a task; (iii) each member of the 
pair was randomly assigned different time limits (10 or 6 minutes) to perform their task, 
therefore making almost sure that their ‘contribution’ would be different, due in great part to 
a chance event (whether they have 6 minutes or 10 minutes) that happens before the task 
begins and the earnings are collected; (iv) participants played a DG in which they can just 
keep their earned endowment, give part of their endowment to the other or take a part of the 
other’s endowment; in other words, they can distribute the pair’s total earnings as they wish. 
The underlying assumption behind condition (iii) is that the person with more available 
minutes has an advantage, and a corresponding responsibility; the foreseeable larger 
contribution of the person with ten minutes would not simply be the effect of chance, but the 
combined effect of chance and additional work on her part. This situation purports to 
represent the most common social distributive problems –those that are solved through 
liberal-egalitarian principles. 
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Let us briefly note that the use of time as a basic resource to represent initial inequality 
has no precedent in experimental literature. The reason may be that more time may imply 
an extra effort, and therefore it may be taken to represent a disadvantage rather than an 
advantage. In this experiment this is not the case, since the task is easy enough, and the 
working time short enough in any case. We are sure –in part from the debriefing questions 
registered after the experiment– that having more time was invariably interpreted by the 
subjects as having an advantage. Other forms of representing initial inequality could have 
been used; but we found that working time required less intervention in the design of the 
rules of the game and was easily identified as a difference that happened before the task 
itself began. 
In our baseline treatment (NOVEIL), subjects were randomly assigned computer-
cubicles and they were anonymously paired with someone else in the room. They were 
informed that they were going to perform a task –which was coding words, translating them 
in numbers by using a conversion table– for which one member of the pair would have six 
minutes, and the other member ten minutes. They were informed that right before the task 
began, they would know whether they have six or ten minutes: this would show on their 
monitors. When they were done, they were informed about each member’s performance 
(total number of words coded and productivity measured as words per minute). The same 
list of words was presented to every participant. Subjects were paid in experimental currency 
called token. At the end of the experiments tokens were converted in Euros at the exchange 
rate of 1 token = €0.20. They received one token for each word correctly coded. At this point, 
each member of the pair had to decide how to divide the total output of the pair by claiming 
any percentage for herself. Once both members of the pair made their choices, one member 
was randomly selected and her choice was implemented. So, each participant decided 
under the expectation that her choice had a 50% probability of being her real final payoff. 
There were no further rounds, and each subject participated just once. Once the member 
with six minutes consumed her task-time, she would be playing a game unrelated with the 
experiment and with no effect on her payoff. 
The VEIL treatment was the same as the NOVEIL except that, before the time limit 
was assigned and the subjects proceeded to the task and decision phases, they were asked 
how they think the total output should be divided, by stating how much (what percentage) 
they should claim for themselves. At this moment they knew the details of the game, but 
they ignored whether they will be given six or ten minutes, so they decided behind a veil 
covering the information about their labour time. Finally, the subjects knew that their choice 
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at this time had no effect on their final choice after the task. This ex-ante phase lasted for 
two minutes, which we calculated is plenty of time. We deliberately gave them time to spare. 
The goal was to make them think; we made clear that they could change their option any 
time until the questionnaire closed. Their choice was recorded, and then they proceeded as 
in the previous treatment: they were informed about the time assigned to each of them and 
they worked on the task. After the task, they could confirm their choice behind the veil, or 
change it.  
In both treatments, instructions were read aloud by one the experimenters and a set 
of control questions were proposed to make sure that participants understood the 
instructions. Participants were students recruited at the University of Granada in May 
2013.50.6% of the participants were females, the average age was of 22.27 years, 96% 
were Spanish, with an average number of previous experiments of 2.13 (max=9); 29% were 
enrolled in the Economics program and 61% in the Management program; 10 were enrolled 
in different programs (see table 1 for the data on the two treatments’ samples). We 
conducted 4 sessions of 20 participants for each treatment, for a total of 80 participants. The 
average of payments was of €11.30 (included a show-up fee of €3). The experiments were 
run at the Egeo Lab (University of Granada). The experiment was programmed by using the 
z-Tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007). We used a between-subjects design; no subject 
participated in more than one treatment.  
 
 
 
We were interested in testing the two following hypotheses, respectively related to 
treatments: 
 
Table 1. The characteristics of the samples (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 NOVEIL VEIL 
Age 22.3 
(1.83) 
 
22.3 
(2.02) 
Gender (% of female) 46.2 
 
55 
Nationality (% of spanish) 96.2 
 
97.5 
Major (% of economics and management 
students) 
87.5 
 
92.5 
Number of experiments in which the subject took 
part. 
2.15 
(1.46) 
 
2.12 
(1.42) 
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Hypothesis 1: Agents in treatment NOVEIL should choose a distribution that tracks 
individual earnings. 
 
It should be a cost, in moral terms, to steal from another who has earned a certain amount 
of money by working – namely the taking option. In addition, if social norms (about work, 
effort, and desert) carry over to the laboratory, they should weigh towards this distribution. 
In other words, even if agents find themselves in complete anonymity and may fear no 
punishment, the design of the experiment seems to call for them to keep what they have 
earned and leave to their partner what (s)he has earned.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Agents in the VEIL treatment should choose a distribution that approximately 
tracks a liberal-egalitarian principle. 
 
Agents in this treatment are subject to the thought experiment of the veil of ignorance. This 
provides an impersonal and impartial point of view that elicits a fairer and less selfish 
behaviour: each individual is drawn to think as if (s)he could have more or less endowment, 
with no reason (randomly). From this each participant is aware that the design involves an 
unjustified inequality; and they have the power to ‘correct’ it by choosing to distribute the 
common output in a more egalitarian way –even if, since they have data about individual 
productivity, we never expected convergence on pure egalitarian distributions. From a moral 
reasoning perspective, our hypothesis 2 means that the Rawlsian assumption about the 
moral capacities of people prevail over the Hobbesian assumption; in other words, the 
hypothesis implies that moral reasoning and moral conclusions would have an effective 
power to shape behaviour even in absence of external public authority. 
 
 
III. Results. 
 
Starting from the evidence on the task, we run a two-way ANOVA to assess the effect of 
treatment and time on the total number of words encoded (table 2). We do not observe any 
significant difference between treatments in terms of amount of words encoded  
(F(1,156)=0.00, p = 0.97) while, as expected, the production of the participants with ten 
minutes is higher than that of participants with six minutes in both the treatments (F = 333,3, 
p < 0.01; interaction of treatment and time: F = 0.00, p = 0.96). Participants received one 
9 
 
token for each word correctly encoded, so the numbers in table 2 correspond also to 
participants’ average earnings. The level of productivity (words per minute) is 5.15 for the 
participants with 6 minutes and 5.26 for those with ten minutes in both the treatments (time: 
F = 0.60, p = 0.44; treatment: F = 0.00, p =  0.97; interaction: F = 0.00, p =0.99). 
 
Table 2: Production (correctly encoded words).  
  Time 
Treatment 
 6 minutes 10 
minutes 
NOVEIL 30.90 
(5.82) 
52.62 
(8.45) 
VEIL  30.92 
(5.37) 
52.67 
(9.62) 
Means, standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
We can then put forward our first result. 
 
Result 1: Production and productivity. 
The production of participants with the same endowment in terms of time is the same across 
treatments. In both treatments, the level of production of participants with ten minutes is 
higher than that of participants with six minutes. There are no differences in the level of 
productivity, neither between treatments nor between subjects with different time groups. 
 
Table 3. Percentage and number of tokens (percentage x total production) claimed after the task. 
  Percentage Tokens 
Treatment 
 6 minutes 10 minutes 6 minutes 10 minutes 
NOVEIL 74.50% 
(19.20) 
77.50% 
(17.05) 
62.29 
(19.10) 
64.35 
(15.17) 
VEIL 74.00% 
(19.18) 
85.75% 
(13.93) 
61.59 
(18.12) 
71.87 
(16.10) 
Means, standard deviations in parentheses.   
 
 
Table 3 (columns 3 and 4) reports the number of tokens claimed by the participants after 
the task, obtained by multiplying the percentage claimed by the total production of the pair. 
In the NOVEIL, the amount of token claimed is significantly higher than t
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earned with the task, for both participants with six minutes and participants with ten minutes 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, participants with six minutes: z = 5.51, p < 0.01; participants with 
ten minutes: z = 3.99, p < 0.01).  
 
Result 2: Individual production and claims in the NOVEIL treatment. 
In NOVEIL treatment participants’ claims are significantly higher than their individual 
production, independently on the time available for the task.  
 
This result is related to hypothesis 1. We certainly expected a better fit between working-
time and claim (claims from subjects with six minutes should be approximately 60% of the 
claim of subjects with ten minutes), and less distance between production and claim –or less 
‘stealing’ from partners. Although there is a difference between claims by ten-minute type 
subjects and six-minute type subjects, the data do not support our hypothesis. However, it 
must be said that the main purpose of treatment NOVEIL was to establish a baseline against 
which to check the effect of the cue introduced in treatment VEIL.  
 
As for hypothesis 2, the implementation of a liberal egalitarian principle, aimed at reducing 
the inequality due to pure luck, would have resulted in participants with six minutes in the 
VEIL treatment asking more than those in the NOVEIL, and participants with ten minutes in 
the VEIL treatment asking less than those in the NOVEIL.   
Looking at the data, we observe that claims by participants with six minutes in the 
two conditions are not significantly different (Wilcoxon rank-sum - Mann-Whitney test, on 
percentages: z = 0.19, p = 0.85; on number of tokens: z = 0.10, p = 0.91). As for participants 
with ten minutes, those in the VEIL ask even more than those in the NOVEIL (on 
percentages: z = 2.19, p = 0.03; on number of tokens: z = 2.11, p = 0.03).  
 
Result 3: Ex post claims across treatments. 
Participants with six minutes in the VEIL treatment make the same claim of those in the 
NOVEIL. Participants with ten minutes in the VEIL treatment ask for more than those in the 
NOVEIL. 
 
Based on result 3 we reject hypothesis 2. 
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Table 4. Percentage claimed before the task in the VEIL treatment 
 Tokens 
Six minutes 73.50 
(17.76) 
Ten minutes 79.50 
(16.78) 
Means, standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
In the VEIL treatment, before knowing the distribution of time within the pairs, subjects were 
asked to choose a percentage of the total production they may claim after the task. Table 4 
reports the average percentage chosen by the subjects, distinguishing between those who 
later would have been assigned six minutes and those who would have been assigned ten 
minutes. We observe that while ex post claimed percentages by participants with six minutes 
(table 3, raw 2, column 1) are not statistically different from their claims ex ante (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, participants with six minutes: z = 0.26, p = 0.79), ex post percentage claims 
of participants with ten minutes (table 3, raw 2, column 2) are even higher than their claims 
ex ante. (z = 2.97, p = 0.03). 
 
Result 4: Ex ante and ex post claims in the VEIL treatment.  
In the ex post phase of the VEIL treatment, participants with six minutes confirm their choice 
ex ante, while participants with ten minutes claim more than what they have judged as the 
right claim ex ante.  
 
Table 5 reports the results of an OLS estimation in which we control for socio-demographic 
characteristics and participants’ experience with experiments. The results reported in 
column 2 confirm that claims of the subjects with ten minutes in the VEIL are slightly higher 
than those of subjects with 10 minutes in the NOVEIL. Interestingly, females claim less than 
male but only in the VEIL treatment, and subjects with less experience with experiments 
claim less than more experienced ones only in the NOVEIL treatment. The results in column 
2 confirm the correlation between claim ex-ante and claim ex-post in the VEIL treatment, 
which is weaker for the subjects with ten minutes who tend to ask more than the ex-ante 
claim with respect to the subjects with six minutes. 
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Table 2. Determinants of individual claims after the task 
 (1) (2) 
 OVERALL VEIL TREATMENT 
AGE -0.161 0.138 
 (0.720) (0.611) 
   
GENDER -0.902 -4.185* 
 (3.890) (2.485) 
   
NATIONALITY 6.256 -2.880 
 (8.206) (8.343) 
   
MAJOR -2.779 0.891 
 (2.313) (2.269) 
   
N. OF  EXPERIMENTS 3.647*** 0.318 
 (1.328) (0.735) 
   
TEN 1.400 30.08*** 
 (3.882) (11.35) 
   
VEIL 10.98*  
 (5.806)  
   
TEN*VEIL 10.31*  
 (5.531)  
   
GENDER*VEIL -7.932  
 (5.554)  
   
N. OF  EXPERIMENTS*VEIL -3.605**  
 (1.755)  
CLAIM EX-ANTE  0.876*** 
  (0.101) 
   
CLAIM  EX-ANTE * TEN  -0.289** 
  (0.143) 
   
CONSTANT 70.41*** 9.028 
 (19.88) (17.72) 
   
Observations 160 80 
R-squared 0.157 0.681 
 
OLS regression. 
The dependent variable is the percentage claimed after the task (in the case of the VEIL treatment it 
corresponds to the ex-post choice) 
Results in column 2 refer only to the subsample of subjects who took part in the VEIL treatment. 
GENDER takes value 1 if the subject is a female and zero otherwise. 
NATIONALITY takes value 1 if the subject is Spanish and zero otherwise. 
MAJOR takes value 1 if the subject is enrolled in an economics or management program and zero 
otherwise. 
N. OF EXPERIMENTS is the number of previous experiments in which the subject took part. 
TEN takes value 1 if the subject is endowed a time of ten minutes and zero otherwise. 
VEIL takes value 1 if the treatments VEIL and zero otherwise. 
CLAIM EX-ANTE is the percentage claimed in the ex-ante phase of the VEIL treatment. 
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Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
In conclusion, our data support neither of our hypotheses. 
 
 
IV. Summary and discussion 
 
In the experiment reported here a majority of young students stole from an anonymous peer. 
They did this while knowing that the earnings that each had contributed to the total to be 
split was obtained through a work they performed –a work that while not particularly hard, 
was not entirely effortless. Even though the game was anonymous (they did not know from 
whom they were taking the money), it was a very homogeneous population of students. This 
fact would have made us predict a higher degree of empathy. According to Binmore (2005), 
this kind of preferences are used to find the fair solution to coordination problems. In 
Seabright’s reading of Natural Justice (Binmore, 2005), we find condensed into a very 
effective phrase the function that empathetic preferences should play: “individuals must 
have empathetic preferences – when imagining themselves in the situation of others, not 
their own” (Seabright, 2005, p.35). Furthermore, “morality serves to coordinate between the 
possible equilibria of social life” (Seabright, 2005, p.36), so the moral rules internalized by 
evolution should help us to resolve potential situations of social inequality. The introduction 
of the veil, applied to an individual rather than a collective choice, should direct behaviour to 
a fair split, levelling to some extent the initial fortuitous disparities. Considering the role that 
internalize moral principles usually have in the process of deliberation, we hypothesized the 
prevalence of the social norms about effort and merit, the unwritten rules about earnings 
and possession; we hypothesized further that a reflection towards fairness, reinforced by 
the individual position of ignorance at the time of the thought-experiment, would help 
bending individual decisions towards equality. Despite the formulation of our working 
hypotheses, we were not particularly optimistic about the effect of these rules on the average 
behaviour of our experimental population, but we definitely expected at least some departure 
from standard results in DG with taking. In the NOVEIL treatment, the fact that income was 
‘earned’ through a task may activate the social norms of merit and desert, and induce claims 
tracking individual’s contributions. In the VEIL treatment, reflection on the unjustified 
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inequality of resources may induce sympathy and the social norm of fair distribution for these 
circumstances –liberal-egalitarian principles. To our dismay, the only significant difference 
between baseline treatment and treatment VEIL was contrary to our hypothesis: subjects 
with ten minutes-time asked, on average, more than their counterparts in the baseline 
treatment. The rejection of our hypotheses left us baffled and wanting an explanation. 
Let us note first that this result may be related to other experiments in which the most 
advantaged subjects were reluctant to give. These experiments usually involve effort and 
luck (Erkal et al, 2011; Rey-Biel et al, 2018; Konow, 2000). However, in our design, having 
more time to perform the task does not imply merit, effort or recognizing some specific 
abilities the player has. The veil of ignorance should have functioned to highlight that the 
initial disparity was not due to a difference in ability amongst subjects but to a merely external 
and random element. As stated by Erkal et al (2011, p. 3332) “in real life, earnings are 
determined not only by effort, but also by luck. Evidence suggests that giving behavior might 
be different when luck affects earnings and that people are more likely to receive support 
when they have been negatively affected by luck (Christina M. Fong 2007)”. Nevertheless, 
when subjects believed that they have earned a certain reward resulting from an effort, 
considerations on fairness ideals and on how material goods should be redistributed would 
not have a significant impact. 
We have reached the conclusion that the setting in which the game was made – 
marked by anonymity and non-iteration– created a context in which there was a lack of 
motivation to act in other-regarding ways. As Eckel and Grossman emphasize: 
 
“The decision makers cannot identify each other, nor do they have enough information to know if their partner 
is poor or otherwise deserving of their generosity; thus there is little or no basis for altruism to play a part in 
the decision. Furthermore, as subjects cannot be identified by either the experimenter or other subjects, there 
is no role for social esteem to affect the decision. Only self esteem (or warm glow) remains. With little 
motivation for other-regarding behavior, it is not surprising that the subjects’ behavior closely approximates the 
game-theoretic predictions for noncooperative, non repeated games with selfish, payoff-maximizing subjects” 
(Eckel & Grossman, 1996, p. 182). 
 
However, some features of our design could make us think of fairer behaviours: the effort 
needed for production –as opposed to the ‘manna from heaven’ situation common in other 
experiments– and the veil of ignorance at the individual level, proved completely irrelevant. 
The veil of ignorance should have had an effect in the final distribution. If everyone had an 
effective sensitivity to moral cues, the fact of allowing subjects to think in advance what 
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percentage of their product to bring home and which one to offer should have fostered a 
fairer behaviour. 
A first explanation could be related to a misunderstanding of the experiment by the 
subjects. However, this possibility was ruled out from the start: not only we did run check 
questions after reading the instructions, but the subjects were well versed in the workings of 
experimental sessions, and most of them had some training in economics or management. 
If anything, our subjects’ ‘mistake’ was to grasp the experiment all too well. They saw the 
true nature of the choice at their disposal and were not influenced by a setting that involved 
working in pairs, or pooling together earnings, or making a distributive choice. They 
understood that at the end of the day, what they were going to get was determined simply 
by their choice –multiplied by the 0.5 chance of being actually selected for final payoff– and 
they responded wisely –in economic terms. They were, on average, very good monetary 
payoff maximizers.  
The fact that our subjects were students, belonging to the same group of reference, 
could have caused gamesmen behaviour, rather than increased sympathy, because the 
context would not be perceived as a situation in which real interests are at stake. This 
interpretation is in line with the results of Hoffman et al. (1996): they saw that “when a double 
blind procedure, intended to guarantee the complete social isolation of the individual’s 
decision (no one including the experimenter or any subsequent observer of the data could 
possibly know any subject’s decision), was used, 64 percent of the offers were $0 with only 
8 percent offering $4 or more” (Hoffman et al, 1996, pp. 653-54). 
On a related line, Fehr et al (2006) found that students attending majors in Economics 
and Management are less sensitive to egalitarian concerns. However, this would not explain 
the surprising result that our ten-minute subjects claimed on average more in the treatment 
with a veil. We were aware of this possible effect, so we were not surprised by the rate of 
‘stealing’ in the baseline treatment. But the null effect of the individual reflection behind the 
veil still wants an explanation. 
Another possible reason for the observed proficiency in maximizing behaviour 
combined with their utter disregard for social norms or lack of pro-social preferences might 
be that the subjects were recruited over a platform Orsee: people included in the platform 
were ‘used’ to do economic experiments, so it may be thought that they are sophisticated 
economic choice-makers. However, we have excluded also this explanation because the 
recruitment of experimental subjects through registration on platforms is a widespread and 
established method to conduct experiments in the laboratory. 
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One potential explanation might have to do with the problem of stability of intentions, 
as it applied to the stability of the principles chosen behind the veil. The subjects might have 
been sensitive to the moral cue, and correctly concluded that the final distribution had to be 
re-distributive, and still fail to follow this conclusion in practice (McClennen, 1989; Klosko, 
1994; Barry, 1995). There is no logical implication that choosing a distribution criterion 
behind the veil will bring about a corresponding behaviour. The problem of stability can be 
read as the problem of compliance: why should subjects act according to a certain ideal of 
fairness –even if it is an ideal they chose as their preferred option before–, when they could 
obtain a greater gain by deviating?  
In our case, there is little difference between ex ante claim and ex post decision; so 
that the ex ante choice can hardly be identified as an ideal to follow. Leaving this aside, 
there are two reasons why this line of reflection would not be wholly satisfactory as an 
explanation. First, our design excludes the interpretation of the ex ante choice as a plan. 
Our subjects know from the beginning that their final choice is up to them and that they will 
decide only after they know all the facts (whether they had six or ten minutes, how much the 
pair produced, etc.). So, there is nothing in the design implying that their first choice is a kind 
of plan they have to follow or rule they have to abide by. The initial choice should work as a 
mere moral cue, that is, a as a reminder of the fact that there was an unjustified inequality, 
and that they had the opportunity to re-dress for it. 
Second, the issue of stability of principles is quite complex, involving psychological 
conditions for the stability of intentions and conceptions of rationality and morality. The 
contribution of this paper is to clarify one aspect of that dynamic, and the experiment 
abstracts as much as possible of the deeper philosophical issues related to the problem of 
stability. Our hypothesis tried to relate the veil of ignorance as moral cue with an adjustment 
of individual behaviour in a prosocial and egalitarian direction. 
The difficulties with this explanation do not imply that our result is irrelevant to the 
debate of stability. After all, the experiment shows that whatever thoughts are derived from 
reasoning behind the veil, they do not carry over to the real choice situation. But from our 
data we cannot conclude whether this is a problem of stability or a problem of irrelevance: 
we cannot know whether our subjects correctly concluded that initial inequality called for re-
dress but then failed to make a re-distributive choice (either ex ante or ex post), or they, also 
correctly, found that reasoning behind the veil was irrelevant in the situation. 
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Upon reflection, the puzzling fact of stealing from peers should not be surprising. Note 
that the final distribution of money (how much one gets) depends on three factors: effort 
(own, and one’s pair), decision, and chance (being selected for final payoff). After all, this is 
what gambling is –think of State lottery: working people voluntarily bet part of their legitimate 
earnings and subject themselves to a chance event. They know that the most likely outcome 
is that someone else will get that money. And in the event that they win, they experience no 
remorse in taking money from other working people, maybe poorer than them. And this is 
because the whole practice is voluntary in the first place and based on free choices. Our 
subjects might have approached the experiment in this ‘gambling mood’ and this would 
explain the result.  
The problem is that this explanation would be applicable to virtually all economic 
experiments involving populations of students with some previous experiments in their 
records.  
It might be the case that, by making the experiment one-shot and anonymous 
dictator’s choice –no chance of reciprocity, no need to regard the other member of the pair’s 
attitudes, believes or dispositions– with the conspicuous absence of punishment by any kind 
of authority, we gave our subjects a true Gige’s ring to act as they pleased (Plato, 2000, 
359d). And our finding is that they behaved as Trasymachus and Hobbes would have 
predicted, rather than the way Socrates, Kant or Rawls would. 
In conclusion, two interesting elements emerge from this study: the effectiveness of 
the veil of ignorance and the actual behavioural adherence to moral principles given the 
social dimension in which we are immersed. We wish to comment on each in turn. 
Regarding the first point, this study shows that the veil of ignorance, as moral device, 
has a low effect on individual choice when used as counter-factual ex ante thought 
experiment. This is in contrast with experiments where the choice behind the veil was the 
result of an actual agreement among parties (Sacconi & Faillo, 2010; Schildberg-Hörisch, 
2010; Faillo et al, 2015). In these cases, impartiality and impersonality – conveyed from the 
veil – had an impact on participants’ behaviour. So, it would be interesting to study the 
conditions under which the veil might work, inducing pro-social behaviour, on individual 
choice – there are many occasions in our everyday life when we have to decide how to 
behave, morally or not, without prior agreements. In general, moral philosophy tends to 
make use of counter-factual reasoning. It may be argued that counter-factual arm-chair 
philosophy is not intended to motivate action, but to justify, or explain. However, criticism 
about the lack of motivating power was taken very seriously by leading contractarian 
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philosophers, like John Rawls or David Gauthier. While acknowledging that their theories, 
being rationalistic and laid out in analytic language, where not particularly enticing, they did 
defend that, properly understood and once the distance between ideal theory and non-ideal 
social conditions are taken into account, they should give people reasons to act as they 
prescribe. We assumed that reasoning behind the veil is a kind of toy moral theory for a 
particular case. Given the setting of the experiment, rational people should get to the 
conclusion that equal –or approximately equal– split would be more justified. They generally 
did reach this conclusion. Now, the fact that they did not take this conclusion as a sufficient 
reason, while actual agreements reached behind the veil do seem to create new normative 
reasons for action, is enlightening. It is a result that has potential interest in institutional 
settings. It speaks of the relevance of the social in inducing real cognitive and motivational 
changes in individual agents.  
Secondly, these results might contribute in defying how to distinguish social and 
moral norms, when such norms are collectively recognized, what they include and how they 
are perceived by the decision makers. Although far from our original intent, what emerged 
seems to be that moral reflections are not so binding on behaviour. Observability, and the 
consequent awareness resulting from a choice made in public, is the fundamental feature 
present in a social dynamic, where the risk of social punishment or exclusion is high. Not 
only that, observability allows each subject to show himself in a certain way – appearing 
right rather than being right – because in social contexts we often want to give a certain 
image of ourselves and then do not betray it, neither in the eyes of others nor in the ones of 
ourselves. This would be a confirmation of how social norms are behavioural rules that arise 
from conditional preferences in certain contexts. Empirical and normative expectations are 
essential ingredients for deciding to follow a social norm and to comply with it, even when a 
decision is the result of an individual deliberation, not influenced by any agreements. Without 
a social environment in which these conditions are created, moral motivations, potentially 
existing in foro interno, do not apply externally (Bicchieri, 2006).  
Following this line, we may say that a moral cue of this type results to be much less 
effective than a minimal social cue as the one proposed by Rigdon and colleagues (2009). 
In that case, presenting a very simple watching-eyes configuration had an impact on giving 
behaviour, while our findings show how inducing a reflection from an impartial point of view 
is not enough under conditions of total anonymity and of individual choice. It seems that 
moral cues have an effect on human behaviour only if they are already proposed as ethical 
principles. For example, reading the Ten Commandments before an experiment in total 
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anonymity had a real weight in leading subjects’ choices towards honest behaviour (Gino et 
al, 2012). Unlike this type of reminder, our findings show that providing time to make subjects 
reflect from an impartial point of view does not have the same cognitive and motivational 
force: it seems much easier to take care of moral principles when someone else makes us 
remember them, instead of finding the ethical answer by our own. 
Despite our hypotheses were rejected, this study might contribute to better 
understand how moral cues can intervene in the decision-making process and to remember 
how important the distinction among social and moral norms is, both in the study of prosocial 
behaviour and in the relationship between motivation and action.  
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